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1.1 Introduction
Controversy regarding the costs and beneﬁts of globalization has taken
center stage in policy and academic circles. While concerns over the bene-
ﬁts of capital mobility once voiced by John Maynard Keynes during the de-
sign of the Bretton Woods System were nearly forgotten in the 1970s and
1980s, the crises of the last decade have revived the debate over the merits
of international ﬁnancial integration.
The most powerful argument in favor of international capital mobility,
voiced by, among others, Stanley Fischer, Maurice Obstfeld, Kenneth Ro-
goﬀ, and Larry Summers, is that it facilitates an eﬃcient global allocation
of savings by channelling ﬁnancial resources to their most productive uses,
thereby increasing economic growth and welfare around the world. But
some other prominent academics are among the skeptics of international
ﬁnancial integration. Paul Krugman (1998), for example, argues that coun-
tries that experience full-blown crises should use capital controls. Dani
Rodrik (1998) claims that international ﬁnancial liberalization creates a
higher risk of crises for developing countries. Even Jagdish Bhagwati, a
ﬁerce proponent of free trade, wonders if the risks of international ﬁnan-
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Financial Globalization for valuable comments and suggestions.cial integration might outweigh its beneﬁts (Bhagwati 1998). As a result,
recent research has focused on how to minimize the instability associated
with international capital markets. Without a comprehensive understand-
ing of the determinants of capital ﬂows and their volatility, however, it is
diﬃcult to evaluate the diﬀerent proposals that have been put forth to mit-
igate the negative eﬀects of international capital mobility.
The determinants of international capital ﬂows and their consequences
for economic growth have been one of the most important issues in the in-
ternational macroeconomics literature.1 However, there is no consensus.
This is mainly due to the fact that diﬀerent researchers focus on diﬀerent
samples of countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment [OECD] countries versus emerging markets), diﬀerent time peri-
ods (1970s versus 1980s versus 1990s), and diﬀerent forms of capital ﬂows
(foreign direct investment/portfolio equity ﬂows versus debt ﬂows or
public ﬂows versus private ﬂows). For example, Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1996) focus on the role of external (push) and internal (pull) fac-
tors as potential determinants of foreign investment using a cross section
of developing countries. They ﬁnd that low interest rates in the United
States played an important role in accounting for the renewal of capital
ﬂows to these countries in the 1990s. Edwards (1991) shows that govern-
ment size and openness are important determinants of inward foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) from OECD to developing countries during the pe-
riod 1971–81. Wei (2000) and Wei and Wu (2002) use data on bilateral FDI
from eighteen industrialized source countries to ﬁfty-nine host countries
during 1994–96 and ﬁnd that corruption reduces the volume of inward
FDI and aﬀects the composition of ﬂows by increasing the loan-to-FDI
ratio during this period.2 Using data on bilateral portfolio equity ﬂows
from a set of fourteen industrialized countries during 1989–96, Portes and
Rey (2005) ﬁnd evidence that imperfections in the international credit mar-
kets can aﬀect the amount and direction of capital ﬂows. Among a set of
developing countries, Lane (2004) also ﬁnds credit market frictions to be a
determinant of debt ﬂows during 1970–95.
These papers have not paid particular attention to the overall role institu-
tions play in shaping long-term capital ﬂows among a cross section of devel-
oped and developing countries. This is a task we started investigating in Al-
faro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2003; henceforth AKV). AKV ﬁnd
institutional quality to be a causal determinant of capital inﬂows, where cur-
rent institutions are instrumented by their historical determinants.3 In this
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1. See Prasad et al. (2003) for an extensive review.
2. Wei and Wu (2002) also investigate the determinants of bilateral bank ﬂows from thir-
teen industrialized source countries to eighty-three host countries, showing similar results.
3. Institutional quality is measured as a composite political safety index. It is the sum of
all the components rated by an independent agency, the PRS Group, in the Internationalpaper, we re-establish our results from AKV for a diﬀerent sample using bal-
ance of payments (BOP) statistics from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).4 We then extend our original analysis in signiﬁcant ways by asking
three main questions: Is there any direct eﬀect of the legal system on foreign
investments other than through its eﬀect on institutions? Is there any role for
policy over institutions? Does institutional quality inﬂuence the volatility of
capital ﬂows?
Our evidence shows that the historical legal origin of a country has a di-
rect impact on capital inﬂows during 1970–2000. We interpret this ﬁnding
as evidence that legal origins measure diﬀerent components of institu-
tional quality, such as investor protection. What about policies? There is an
important distinction between policies and institutions. Institutions are
sets of rules constraining human behavior.5 Policies are choices made
within a political and social structure that is, within a set of institutions. As
mentioned, we ﬁnd institutional quality to have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect over
policies as a determinant of capital ﬂows. Given this, it is important to
know if there is any role left for policymaking. In order to investigate this
question, we look at the changes in the level of capital inﬂows and regress
them on the policy changes and institutional quality changes from the ﬁrst
half to the second half of the sample period. In those regressions, both
changes in institutions and policy variables, such as inﬂation, capital con-
trols, and ﬁnancial development, are shown to have a role in explaining the
changes in capital inﬂows. This result has important policy implications in
the sense that improving institutions and domestic policies can increase the
inward foreign investment to a country over time.
Finally, we examine the determinants of the volatility of capital ﬂows
and study whether institutions and policies play a role in reducing the in-
stability in the international ﬁnancial markets. Theoretical research has
linked capital ﬂow volatility to periods of liberalization. One argument is
that the unprecedented globalization of the securities market in the 1990s
resulted in high volatility of capital ﬂows.6 Other researchers model how
frictions in the international ﬁnancial markets together with weak funda-
mentals lead to excessive volatility of capital ﬂows.7The empirical work fo-
cuses more on ﬁnancial crises. That literature shows that bad policies, such
as ﬁscal deﬁcits, inﬂation, and bank fragility, seem to matter for the ﬁnan-
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Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The components are government stability, internal conﬂict, ex-
ternal conﬂict, no corruption, militarized politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic
tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. See Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002) for the historical determinants of current institutional quality.
4. AKV calculate inﬂows using data on foreign-owned stocks estimated by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (1999, 2001) and Kraay et al. (2000), in addition to using BOP data from IMF.
5. See North (1994, 1995).
6. See Calvo and Mendoza (2000a, 2000b) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000).
7. See Chari and Kehoe (2003).cial crises, which may be regarded as episodes of extreme volatility.8Our ev-
idence suggests that both low institutional quality and bad policies, in par-
ticular bad monetary policy, have played a role in the long-run volatility of
capital ﬂows during 1970–2000.9
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a preliminary
discussion on capital mobility, institutions, and policies. Section 1.3 pre-
sents extensive data and overviews the stylized facts related to capital ﬂow
mobility and the volatility of these ﬂows during 1970–2000. Section 1.4 pre-
sents results on the determinants of capital ﬂows, changes in capital ﬂows
over time, and capital ﬂow volatility. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Capital Flows and Institutions
Despite the surge in capital mobility over the last decade, capital ﬂows
from rich to poor countries have been at much lower levels than predicted
by the standard neoclassical models.10This phenomenon is usually referred
to as the “Lucas paradox.”11 Lucas (1990) examines international capital
movements from the perspective of rich and poor countries. Under the
standard assumptions—such as countries producing the same goods with
the same constant returns to scale production function, the same factors of
production, and the same technology—and where there is free capital mo-
bility, new investment will occur only in the poorer economy, and this will
continue to be true until the returns to capital in every location are equal-
ized. Hence, Lucas argues that given the implications of the frictionless
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8. See Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (2001), Kaminsky (2003), and Frankel and Wei (2004). McKinnon and Pill (1996)
model how ﬁnancial liberalization together with distortions can make boom-bust cycles even
more pronounced by fueling lending booms that lead to the eventual collapse of the banking
system. Aizenman (2004) links ﬁnancial crises to ﬁnancial opening. Other researchers have
found that stabilization programs cause large capital inﬂows at the early stages of the ex-
change rate stabilization reforms, followed by high capital ﬂow reversals when the lack of
credibility behind the peg fuels an attack against the domestic currency. See Calvo and Vegh
(1999).
9. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) examine the relation between “original
sin” (the inability of countries to borrow abroad in their own currencies) and capital ﬂow
volatility for thirty-three countries. The work by Gavin and Hausmann (1999) and Gavin,
Hausmann, and Leiderman (1995) establishes the volatility patterns for Latin American
countries up to the early 1990s and relates them to external shocks and internal policies; see
also Inter-American Development Bank (1995).
10. Section 1.3 documents this and other facts related to international capital ﬂows.
11. The Lucas paradox, the lack of ﬂows from rich to poor countries, is related to some of
the major puzzles in the literature: the high correlation between savings and investment in
OECD countries (the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle), the lack of investment in foreign capital
markets by home-country residents (the home bias puzzle), and the low correlations of con-
sumption growth across countries (the lack of risk sharing puzzle). All of these puzzles deal
with the question of the lack of international capital ﬂows. See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ(2000) for
an overview of the major puzzles in international economies.neoclassical theory, the fact that more capital does not ﬂow from rich
countries to poor countries constitutes a paradox.
Lucas’s work has spawned an extensive theoretical literature. Re-
searchers, including Lucas himself, show that with slight modiﬁcations of
the basic neoclassical theory, such as changing the production structure,
adding an internationally immobile factor such as human capital, or devi-
ating from perfect markets assumption, the paradox disappears. The main
theoretical explanations for the Lucas paradox can be broadly grouped
into two categories.12 The ﬁrst group includes diﬀerences in fundamentals
that aﬀect the production structure of the economy. Researchers have
explored the role of omitted factors of production, government policies,
institutions, and diﬀerences in technology.13 The second group of expla-
nations emphasizes international capital market imperfections, mainly
sovereign risk and asymmetric information. Although capital is potentially
productive and has a high return in developing countries, it does not ﬂow
there because of market failures.14
Empirical research on the Lucas paradox is rather limited. As far as in-
direct evidence goes, O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) ﬁnd that before
World War I British capital chased European emigrants, when both were
seeking cheap land and natural resources. Clemens and Williamson (2004),
using data on British investment in thirty-four countries during the nine-
teenth century, show that two-thirds of the historical British capital ex-
ports went to the labor-scarce New World and only about one-quarter to
labor-abundant Asia and Africa for similar reasons. Direct evidence is pro-
vided by AKV, who investigate the role of the diﬀerent explanations for the
lack of inﬂows of capital (FDI, portfolio equity, and debt) from rich to
poor countries—the “paradox.” Using cross-country regressions, and pay-
ing particular attention to endogeneity issues, AKV show that during
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12. For a recent overview of the diﬀerent explanations behind the Lucas paradox, see Rein-
hart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
13. For the role of diﬀerent production functions, see King and Rebelo (1993); for the role
of government policies, see Razin and Yuen (1994); for the role of institutions, see Tornell and
Velasco (1992); for the role of total factor productivity (TFP), see Glick and Rogoﬀ (1995)
and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2005). Note that it is very diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate both theoretically
and empirically between the eﬀect of institutions and the eﬀect of TFP on investment oppor-
tunities, given that institutional quality is also a determinant of TFP. Prescott (1998) argues
that the eﬃcient use of the currently operating technology or resistance to the adoption of
new ones depends on the “arrangements” a society employs. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2005)
study capital ﬂows between U.S. states, where there is a common institutional structure. They
show these ﬂows to be consistent with a simple neoclassical model with TFP that varies across
states and over time and where capital freely moves across state borders. In this framework,
capital ﬂows to states that experience a relative increase in TFP.
14. Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) show that asymmetric information problems might cause a
reversal in the direction of capital ﬂows relative to the perfect-information case. Gordon and
Bovenberg (1996) develop a model with asymmetric information that explains the diﬀerences
in corporate taxes and, hence, diﬀerences in real interest rates.1970–2000 institutional quality is the most important causal variable ex-
plaining the Lucas paradox.
What about pre-1970 capital ﬂows? Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) charac-
terize four diﬀerent periods in terms of the U-shaped evolution of capital
mobility.15An upswing in capital mobility occurred from 1880 to 1914 dur-
ing the gold standard period. Before 1914, capital movements were free
and ﬂows reached unprecedented levels. The international ﬁnancial mar-
kets broke up during World War I. In the 1920s, policymakers around the
world tried to reconstruct the international ﬁnancial markets. Britain re-
turned to the gold standard in 1925 and led the way to restoring the inter-
national gold standard for a short period. Capital mobility increased be-
tween 1925 and 1930. As the world economy collapsed into depression in
the 1930s, so did the international capital markets. World War II was fol-
lowed by a period of limited capital mobility. Capital ﬂows began to in-
crease starting in the 1960s, and further expanded in the 1970s after the
demise of the Bretton Woods system. In terms of the Lucas paradox,
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) argue that capital was somewhat biased toward
the rich countries in the ﬁrst global capital market boom in pre-1914, but
it is even more so today. In the pre-1914 boom, there was little diﬀerence
between net ﬂows and gross ﬂows because most of the ﬂows were unidirec-
tional from the rich core to the periphery. Post-1970 gross ﬂows (both in-
ﬂows and outﬂows) relative to GDP increased tremendously. But net ﬂows
(inﬂows minus outﬂows) stayed constant at relatively low levels for the last
thirty years. This is consistent with the fact that most ﬂows are between
rich countries (called north-north as opposed to north-south). Obstfeld
and Taylor (2004) conclude that modern capital ﬂows are mostly “diversi-
ﬁcation ﬁnance” rather than “development ﬁnance.”
If the Lucas paradox was to a certain extent a feature of the pre-1914
global capital market boom, and even more so in the last thirty years, what
is the explanation? We argue that it is diﬀerences in institutional quality
among the poor and rich countries. Institutions are the rules of the game
in a society. They consist of both informal constraints (traditions, customs)
and formal rules (regulations, laws, and constitutions). They create the in-
centive structure of an economy. Institutions are understood to aﬀect eco-
nomic performance through their eﬀect on investment decisions by pro-
tecting the property rights of entrepreneurs against the government and
other segments of society and preventing elites from blocking the adoption
of new technologies. In general, weak property rights owing to poor qual-
ity institutions can lead to lack of productive capacities or uncertainty of
returns in an economy.
Lucas (1990) argues that “political risk” cannot explain the lack of ﬂows
before 1945 because during that time most poor countries were subject to
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15. See also Eichengreen (2003) and O’Rourke and Williamson (1999).European legal arrangements imposed through colonialism. He gives In-
dia as an example, arguing that investors in India were governed by the
same rules and regulations as investors in the United Kingdom. However,
the recent work on institutions and growth by Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002) illustrates how conditions in the colonies shaped to-
day’s institutions. The British institutions in India do not necessarily have
the same quality as the British institutions in the United States and Aus-
tralia. They argue that it is not the legal origin or the identity of the colo-
nizer that matters for shaping institutions, but whether the European co-
lonialists could safely settle in a particular location. If the European
settlement was discouraged by diseases or surplus extraction was beneﬁcial
via an urbanized and prosperous population, the Europeans set up worse
institutions. This is also consistent with the argument of Reinhart and Ro-
goﬀ (2004), who emphasize the relationship between sovereign risk and
historical defaults and conclude that sovereign risk must be the explana-
tion for the Lucas paradox. Historically bad institutions are strong predic-
tors of sovereign risk and, hence, historical serial default.
In the next section we present an overview of the general patterns of in-
ternational capital mobility and capital ﬂow volatility over the last thirty
years. These data show that, despite the dramatic increase in capital ﬂows
over the last two decades, most capital ﬂows to rich countries.
1.3 International Capital Flows: 1970–2000
1.3.1 Data
We use data on annual capital ﬂows from the International Financial Sta-
tistics (IFS) issued by the IMF. Although there are other data sources, the
IFS provides the most comprehensive and comparable data on interna-
tional capital ﬂows.16 These data are described in detail in appendix A.
One might expect that in the ﬁnancial account (formerly called the cap-
ital account) of the BOP, changes in liabilities should be shown as positive
entries (inﬂows) and changes in assets should be shown as negative entries
(outﬂows). In practice, changes in both liabilities and assets are reported as
net of any disinvestment, and consequently both can have any sign. In the
BOP accounts, an increase (decrease) in liabilities to foreigners is entered
as positive (negative), while an increase (decrease) in foreign assets held by
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16. The balance of payments (BOP) statistics, also issued by the IMF, present the same
data. There are two presentations of the BOP data: Analytical and Standard. IFS and BOP
Analytical present the same data and report “exceptional ﬁnancing” as a separate line. BOP
Standard, on the other hand, does not report “exceptional ﬁnancing” as a separate line and
instead includes it in the “other investment” category (refer to IMF 1993). Items reported un-
der “exceptional ﬁnancing” vary from country to country and are described in the country
proﬁles in the corresponding BOP manual.locals is entered as negative (positive).17 Following this convention, net
ﬂows of capital are calculated as the sum of the ﬂows of foreign claims on
domestic capital (change in liabilities) and the ﬂows of domestic claims on
foreign capital (change in assets) in a given year. Gross ﬂows of capital are
calculated as the sum of the absolute value of the ﬂows of foreign claims
on domestic capital and the absolute value of the ﬂows of domestic claims
on foreign capital in a given year. Hence, they are always positive.
The main categories of capital ﬂows are FDI, portfolio equity invest-
ment, and debt ﬂows. In what follows, we describe the deﬁnition and mea-
surement of these categories in great detail.
Total Equity Flows
For FDI, we use direct investment abroad (IFS line 78bdd) and direct in-
vestment in reporting economy (line 78bed). These categories include eq-
uity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives
associated with various intercompany transactions between aﬃliated
enterprises. For portfolio equity investment, we use equity security assets
(line 78bkd) and equity security liabilities (line 78bmd), which include
shares, stock participation, and similar documents (such as American de-
pository receipts) that usually denote ownership of equity.
Direct investments include greenﬁeld investments and equity participa-
tion giving a controlling stake. When a foreign investor purchases a local
ﬁrm’s securities without exercising control over the ﬁrm, the investment is
regarded as a portfolio investment. The IMF classiﬁes an investment as di-
rect if a foreign investor holds at least 10 percent of a local ﬁrm’s equity
while the remaining equity purchases are classiﬁed under portfolio equity
investment. In the regression analysis, we do not distinguish between mi-
nority and majority shareholders, as this distinction is not important to
our analysis. In addition, because of missing or insuﬃcient portfolio data
(some countries tend not to receive portfolio ﬂows, due in part to lack of
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17. The balance of payment is a record of a country’s transactions with the rest of the world.
The ﬁnancial account within the balance of payments, broadly speaking, keeps track of trans-
actions in ﬁnancial assets. It reports changes in the asset position (assets and liabilities) of a
country vis-à-vis the rest of the world. For example, if a U.S. ﬁrm imports goods from Switzer-
land for $10 million and pays with a check drawn on a U.S. bank, the corresponding transac-
tion in the ﬁnancial account is recorded as an increase in U.S. liabilities to foreigners (a credit
of $10 million). If the payment is drawn against an account the U.S. ﬁrm has in a Swiss bank,
the corresponding transaction in the ﬁnancial account is recorded as a reduction in U.S. as-
sets (a credit of $10 million). Note that a country’s balance of payment record is kept accord-
ing to the principles of double-entry bookkeeping. The corresponding balancing transaction
would be a debit (–$10 million) in the current account (import of goods). A speciﬁc example
is as follows: On September 1, 1998, as part of a broader set of policies to restrict capital out-
ﬂows, the Malaysian government eliminated the oﬀshore trading of the Malaysian ringgit by
requiring all ringgit oﬀshore to be repatriated within a month. By the end of 1998 the account
“other investment” was –4,604 million U.S. dollars. This amount, among other transactions,
reﬂects the repatriation of the ringgit, which will show as a reduction in Malaysian liabilities.functioning stock markets), we prefer to use total equity ﬂows in the anal-
ysis, which is the sum of ﬂows of FDI and ﬂows of portfolio equity.
Debt Flows
For debt ﬂows, we use debt security assets (IFS line 78bld) and debt se-
curity liabilities (line 78bnd) as well as other investment assets (line 78bhd)
and other investment liabilities (line 78bid). Debt securities include bonds,
debentures, notes, and money market or negotiable debt instruments.
Other investments include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered in direct
investment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets. Ma-
jor categories are trade credits, loans, transactions in currency and de-
posits, and other assets.
Data Issues
Although the IMF provides the most comprehensive data, there are sev-
eral issues associated with the compilation of the BOP statistics, as dis-
cussed in greater detail by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). A substantial
amount of data is missing for many countries, in particular for developing
countries. In addition, some countries do not report data for all forms of
capital ﬂows. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to verify whether the data are in
fact missing as opposed to simply being zero. For example, portfolio equity
data for most countries were negligible until recently. There are additional
misreporting issues related to the fact that several countries tend to report
data for liabilities only and not for assets. This is particularly the case for
FDI ﬂows. Some of these data, reported in the liability line, seem to corre-
spond to net ﬂows (i.e., liabilities minus assets). For debt data, there are
additional issues. Consequent to the debt crisis there are a number of
measurement problems related to diﬀerent methodologies for recording
nonpayments, rescheduling, debt forgiveness, and reductions.18Finally, the
time coverage of the data varies substantially from country to country.
Most developed countries begin reporting data in the early 1970s, and a
substantial subset of developing countries in the mid-1970s. For other
countries, data are not available until the mid-1980s or early 1990s.
Stocks versus Flows and Valuation Eﬀects
The IFS reports BOP transactions as ﬂows of equity and debt. In 1997,
the IMF began to report international investment position for each coun-
try—that is, the stocks. However, stocks are not just cumulative ﬂows; they
also depend on capital gains, losses, and defaults—that is, on valuation ad-
justments. These stocks reported by the IMF are reported by countries
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18. As noted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), these issues create large discrepancies
among debt data reported by diﬀerent methodologies. We thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
for pointing this out to us and helping us with the data in general.themselves. Some calculate them in a pretty sophisticated fashion (with
surveys, etc.), while others cumulate ﬂows with valuation adjustments.
Kraay et al. (2000; hereafter KLSV) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999,
2001; hereafter LM) construct consistent estimates of foreign assets and
liabilities and their subcomponents for diﬀerent countries in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s, paying particular attention to these valuation eﬀects.
LM estimate stocks of equity and FDI based on the IMF ﬂow data ad-
justed to reﬂect changes in ﬁnancial market prices and exchange rates. In
order to estimate FDI stocks, the authors accumulate ﬂows and adjust for
the eﬀects of exchange rate changes. For equity stocks, they adjust for
changes in the end-of-year U.S. dollar value of the domestic stock market.
KLSV argue against the valuation of stocks using ﬁnancial market prices,
maintaining that capital listed on the stock market and the corresponding
share prices—especially in developing countries—are not representative
of the stock of capital of a country or of the value of a ﬁrm. Instead, they
use the price of investment goods in local currency, which is the investment
deﬂator. They also adjust for exchange rate changes. LM found the corre-
lation between the ﬁrst diﬀerence of foreign claims on capital and current
account to be generally high but signiﬁcantly below unity for several coun-
tries, conﬁrming the importance of valuation adjustments.
1.3.2 Some Stylized Facts
We express all ﬂows in 1995 U.S. dollars using the U.S. consumer price
index (CPI) taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
We divide these ﬂows by the corresponding country’s population, taken
from the same source. We believe that data expressed as real dollars per
capita are consistent with the neoclassical theory and provide a better pic-
ture of the evolution of the global capital markets over the last three
decades. We exclude from the sample countries with populations of less
than half a million, because very small countries in the sample tend to dis-
tort the pattern of capital ﬂows per capita. We have data on 72 countries
for FDI, 68 countries for portfolio equity, and 122 for debt ﬂows.19
Total inﬂows of capital per capita as well as each of the components in-
creased substantially throughout the sample period for most of our coun-
tries. Average inﬂows of capital per capita within our sample grew by 4.8 per-
cent per year during the sample period. There is, however, variability in
terms of the composition. Figure 1.1 plots the evolution of the composition
of inﬂows of capital per capita for the countries in our sample.20 The in-
creasing role of FDI and portfolio ﬂows is evident. Based on the sample of
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19. In calculating total equity ﬂows, we treat missing portfolio equity data as zero. We then
add zero and FDI for that country. So we also have seventy-two countries for the total equity
ﬂows. The four countries with FDI data but no portfolio equity data are Bolivia, Central
African Republic, Mauritius, and Papua New Guinea.
20. See appendix tables 1B.1 and 1B.2 for the list of countries.72 countries, average inﬂows of FDI per capita grew by 6.2 percent over the
last thirty years and became the main source of private capital for develop-
ing countries during the 1990s. For our sample of 68 countries, average in-
ﬂows of portfolio equity per capita grew by 9.3 percent. Finally, based on 122
countries, average inﬂows of debt per capita grew by 3.3 percent. Although
their role is quite dominant, debt inﬂows clearly contracted following the
1980s’ debt crisis. Figure 1.2 plots the evolution of the composition of the
gross ﬂows per capita. The patterns overall are similar to those in ﬁgure 1.1.
Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 plot the evolution of FDI, portfolio equity, and
debt ﬂows per capita, respectively. FDI ﬂows remained relatively stable for
most of the sample period, then increased steadily around the mid-1990s.
Portfolio equity ﬂows rose as well but ﬂuctuated more. Debt ﬂows also ﬂuc-
tuated, increasing during the 1970s, then crashing following the wake of
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Fig. 1.1 Capital inﬂows per capita by type of ﬂow, 1970–2000
Notes: Inﬂows represent inﬂows of FDI, portfolio equity investment, and debt divided by
population based on IMF data in 1995 U.S. dollars. FDI data are available for 72 countries,
portfolio data for 68 countries, and debt data for 122 countries. Inﬂows represent ﬂows of for-
eign claims on domestic capital (liability). FDI inﬂows correspond to Direct Investment in
Reporting Economy (IFS line 78bed), which includes equity capital, reinvested earnings,
other capital and ﬁnancial derivatives associated with various intercompany transactions be-
tween aﬃliated enterprises. Portfolio equity inﬂows correspond to Equity Liabilities (line
78bmd), which include shares, stock participations, and similar documents that usually de-
note ownership of equity. Data on inﬂows of debt include Debt Securities Liabilities (line
78bnd), which include bonds, notes, and money market, or negotiable debt instruments; and
Other Investment Liabilities (line 78bid), which include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered
by direct investment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets.the 1980s debt crisis and reviving only in the 1990s. Figures 1.4 and 1.5
show that net portfolio and net debt ﬂows become negative after 1995, a
phenomenon driven mainly by industrial countries whose external asset
holdings tend to exceed the liability holdings. With a few exceptions (in
particular the United States), most of the developed countries have nega-
tive ﬁnancial accounts. This is consistent with the results of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001), which show net foreign asset positions on average to
be increasing since 1995 for developed countries.
Panel A of ﬁgure 1.6 shows total equity inﬂows, which is the sum of in-
ﬂows of FDI and inﬂows of portfolio equity investment, for twenty OECD
and ﬁfty-two developing countries. The diﬀerence between the two is a
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Fig. 1.2 Gross ﬂows per capita by type of ﬂow, 1970–2000
Notes: Gross ﬂows represent gross ﬂows of FDI, portfolio equity investment, and debt di-
vided by population based on IMF data in 1995 U.S. dollars and correspond to the sum of the
absolute value of the ﬂows of assets (outﬂows) and liabilities (inﬂows). FDI data are available
for 72 countries, portfolio data for 68 countries, and debt data for 122 countries. FDI assets
and liabilities correspond respectively to Direct Investment Abroad (IFS line 78bdd) and Di-
rect Investment in Reporting Economy (line 78bed) and include equity capital, reinvested
earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives associated with various intercompany trans-
actions between aﬃliated enterprises. Portfolio equity investment assets and liabilities corre-
spond to Equity Securities Assets (line 78bkd) and Equity Securities Liabilities (line 78bmd)
and include shares, stock participations, and similar documents that usually denote owner-
ship of equity. Debt assets and liabilities include Debt Security Assets (line 78bld) and Debt
Security Liabilities (line 78bnd), which include bonds and money market or negotiable debt
instruments; Other Investment Assets (line 78bhd); and Other Investment Liabilities (line
78bid), which include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered by direct investment, portfolio in-
vestment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets.stark demonstration of north-north ﬂows, or the Lucas paradox. Panel B
of the ﬁgure shows the share of total equity inﬂows to total capital inﬂows
for the OECD and developing countries. Since 1990, almost half of the to-
tal inﬂows were composed of FDI and portfolio equity investment for both
rich and poor countries. Total equity ﬂows are clearly an important part of
the big picture, especially for poor countries.
Tables 1.1–1.4 present a variety of descriptive statistics on the various
forms of capital ﬂows for our sample of countries from 1970 to 2000. Table
1.1 provides descriptive statistics for inﬂows of capital per capita. Total
capital inﬂows vary from –44.94 to 8320.9, with a mean of 406.29 dollars
per capita. During the sample period, debt inﬂows averaged 284.07 dollars
per capita, FDI inﬂows 169.44 dollars per capita, and total equity inﬂows
232.70 dollars per capita. Table 1.2 shows the increasing role of FDI and
portfolio inﬂows per capita over debt inﬂows per capita for all regions
(sub-Saharan Africa is the exception, where all types of inﬂows have a de-
clining trend). These trends notwithstanding, the bulk of capital still ﬂows
to high-income countries, which attract 80 percent of all capital inﬂows.
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Fig. 1.3 FDI ﬂows per capita, 1970–2000
Notes: Flows represent ﬂows of FDI divided by population based on IMF data in 1995 U.S.
dollars. Data are for 72 countries. Inﬂows represent ﬂows of foreign claims on domestic cap-
ital (liability). Net ﬂows are calculated as the diﬀerence between corresponding inﬂows (lia-
bilities) and outﬂows (assets). Gross ﬂows correspond to the sum of the absolute value of the
ﬂows of assets and liabilities. FDI assets and liabilities correspond, respectively, to Direct In-
vestment Abroad (IFS line 78bdd) and Direct Investment in Reporting Economy (line 78bed)
and include equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives asso-
ciated with various intercompany transactions between aﬃliated enterprises.Table 1.3 presents summary statistics on the volatility of inﬂows of cap-
ital per capita. The volatility of inﬂows of capital is calculated as the stan-
dard deviation of the corresponding inﬂows per capita divided by the mean
of gross ﬂows over the sample period, which is the average of the absolute
value of the inﬂows and the absolute value of the outﬂows per capita (hence
always positive). Normalization prevents spuriously higher volatility in the
recent period due to higher ﬂow volume. Table 1.4 shows the volatility of
the diﬀerent forms of inﬂows of capital to have been lower during the
1990s. FDI ﬂows are generally less volatile than portfolio ﬂows as they tend
to be driven by long-term considerations. Debt ﬂows also exhibit higher
volatility relative to FDI. Inﬂows of portfolio and debt experienced higher
volatility during the 1980s consequent to the debt crises and the increasing
role of portfolio ﬂows in the aftermath of the crises. As expected, the
volatility of each component of inﬂows of capital is lower for high-income
countries than for developing countries. The volatility of inﬂows has re-
mained relatively constant for South and Southeast Asian countries, with
a slight increase during the 1990s driven by increased volatility of inﬂows
of portfolio capital in the periods before and after the Asian crisis of the
32 Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych
Fig. 1.4 Portfolio ﬂows per capita, 1970–2000
Notes: Flows represent ﬂows of portfolio equity investment divided by population based on
IMF data in 1995 U.S. dollars. Data are for 68 countries. Inﬂows represent ﬂows of foreign
claims on domestic capital (liability). Net ﬂows are calculated as the diﬀerence between cor-
responding inﬂows (liabilities) and outﬂows (assets). Gross ﬂows correspond to the sum of the
absolute value of the ﬂows of assets and liabilities. Portfolio equity investment assets and lia-
bilities correspond, respectively, to Equity Securities Assets (IFS line 78bkd) and Equity Se-
curities Liabilities (line 78bmd) and include shares, stock participations, and similar docu-
ments that usually denote ownership of equity.late 1990s. Recently opened-up countries in Eastern Europe experienced a
dramatic increase in the volatility of all forms of inﬂows of capital during
the 1990s. For Latin America, on the other hand, the 1980s were turbulent
years mostly driven by the debt crisis. The volatility of inﬂows of capital
has declined during the 1990s. A similar pattern is observed for sub-
Saharan Africa. The volatility of inﬂows of capital increased substantially
in the 1990s for the Middle Eastern and North African countries.21
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Determinants of Capital Flows
For the regression analysis, we exclude countries with substantial miss-
ing data. In addition, there are various outliers in terms of capital ﬂows per
Capital Flows in a Globalized World 33
Fig. 1.5 Debt ﬂows per capita, 1970–2000
Notes: Flows represent ﬂows of debt divided by population based on IMF data in 1995 U.S.
dollars. Data are for 122 countries. Inﬂows represent ﬂows of foreign claims on domestic cap-
ital (liability). Net ﬂows are calculated as the diﬀerence between corresponding inﬂows (lia-
bility) and outﬂows (asset). Gross ﬂows correspond to the sum of the absolute value of the
ﬂows of assets and liabilities. Debt assets and liabilities include, respectively, Debt Securities
Assets (IFS line 78bld) and Debt Securities Liabilities (line 78bnd), which cover bonds, notes,
and money market or negotiable debt instruments; Other Investment Assets (line 78bhd); and
Other Investment Liabilities (line 78bid), which include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered
by direct investment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets.
21. Note that a very volatile form of foreign capital is foreign aid, which is driven by a host
of factors, as shown by Alesina and Dollar (2000), and is not the focus of this study.A
B
Fig. 1.6 A, Total equity inﬂows to rich and poor countries, 1970–2000; B, ratio of
total equity inﬂows to total inﬂows to rich and poor countries, 1970–2000
Notes: Total equity inﬂows represent inﬂows of FDI and portfolio equity investment divided
by population based on IMF data in 1995 U.S. dollars. Data are for 72 countries for which to-
tal equity data are available and are averaged over ﬁve-year periods: FDI inﬂows correspond
to Direct Investment in Reporting Economy (IFS line 78bed), which includes equity capital,
reinvested earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives associated with various inter-
company transactions between aﬃliated enterprises. Portfolio equity inﬂows correspond to
Equity Liabilities (line 78bmd), which includes shares, stock participations, and similar doc-
uments that usually denote ownership of equity. Rich countries denote high-income OECD
countries; poor countries denote the remaining ones.
In panel B, Total inﬂows are the sum of total equity inﬂows and debt divided by population
based on IMF data in 1995 US$. Data on inﬂows of debt include Debt Securities Liabilities
(IFS line 78bnd), which cover bonds or negotiable debt instruments, and Other Investment
Liabilities (line 78bid), which include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered in direct invest-
ment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets.capita. This, of course, should be considered in the econometric analysis.
Table 1.5 lists the countries used in the regression analysis.22
The dependent variable is inﬂows of capital per capita, which is inﬂows
of total equity (FDI and portfolio equity) investment averaged over the
sample period. We prefer to abstract most of our analysis from debt ﬂows
since they tend to be shaped by government decisions to a greater extent
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics: Inﬂows of capital, 1970–2000 (per capita 
U.S. dollars; sample: 122 countries)
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
FDI inﬂows 169.44 292.44 –122.51 1,723.78
Portfolio equity inﬂows 104.82 273.12 –2.17 1,769.21
Debt inﬂows 284.07 656.00 –83.56 4,827.94
Total equity inﬂows 232.70 487.09 –122.51 3,492.99
Total equity and debt inﬂows 406.29 1,012.32 –44.94 8,320.92
Notes:Inﬂows represent ﬂows of foreign claims on domestic capital (liability) divided by pop-
ulation based on IMF data in 1995 U.S. dollars. FDI inﬂows correspond to Direct Investment
in Reporting Economy (IFS line 78bed), which includes equity capital, reinvested earnings,
other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives associated with various intercompany transactions be-
tween aﬃliated enterprises. Portfolio equity inﬂows correspond to Equity Liabilities (line
78bmd), which include shares, stock participations, and similar documents that usually de-
note ownership of equity. Data on inﬂows of debt include Debt Securities Liabilities (line
78bnd), which include bonds, notes, and money market or negotiable debt instruments; and
Other Investment Liabilities (line 78bid), which include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered
by direct investment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets. Inﬂows of to-
tal equity are the sum of FDI and portfolio equity investments. Total equity data are available
for 72 countries; debt data are for 122 countries. See appendix tables 1B.1 and 1B.2 for coun-
tries in the sample.
22. We keep track of the series of countries that have data throughout the whole sample pe-
riod, as shown in appendix table 1B.3. The table provides descriptive statistics for a subsam-
ple of forty-seven countries for which there are data for both total equity and debt ﬂows
throughout the diﬀerent decades. This subsample exhibits overall patterns similar to our re-
gression sample. The forty-seven countries of this subsample are shown in boldface type in
appendix table 1B.1. Unfortunately, we cannot use this sample in the regressions because
there are several outliers. In addition, some of our independent variables do not exist for this
subsample. Benelux and Singapore are outliers in terms of large inﬂows. Bahrain, Botswana,
Gabon, Burkina Faso, and Niger do not have human capital data. Central African Republic,
Fiji, Libya, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Chad are outliers in terms of other independent vari-
ables. This leaves us with a sample of thirty-four countries. In order to increase the number of
observations we add the countries shown in italics. Although data for these countries start
later in the sample period, there are enough data to construct averages over the period. Out
of these twenty-three late starters, we cannot use Burundi, Switzerland, China, Kuwait,
Latvia, Mauritania, Namibia, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. Switzerland and
Kuwait are outliers in terms of large inﬂows. China is an outlier in terms of very low levels of
GDP per capita. Latvia and Slovenia do not have human capital data. The rest are outliers
for the other independent variables. So we add the remaining thirteen to our thirty-four and
have our forty-seven-country sample for the regression analysis as shown in table 1.5. Ending
up again with a sample of forty-seven is pure coincidence.Table 1.2 Inﬂows of capital by decade and region, 1970–2000 (per capita
U.S. dollars; sample: 122 countries)
1970–2000 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
FDI inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 348.93 115.73 170.23 684.52
Latin America and Caribbean 92.67 60.18 44.26 158.93
East Asia Paciﬁc 247.90 115.38 208.70 419.82
South Asia 1.96 0.45 1.73 2.87
Europe and Central Asia 109.70 2.03 3.26 116.83
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.67 32.86 22.88 6.49
Middle East and North Africa 55.31 –114.64 29.13 128.67
Portfolio equity inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 223.24 11.55 92.02 442.02
Latin America and Caribbean 9.06 –0.10 4.99 15.69
East Asia Paciﬁc 33.93 24.72 54.59 53.98
South Asia 1.08 0.06 0.14 1.19
Europe and Central Asia 22.19 n.a. 1.11 22.26
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.91 3.49 –1.15 10.77
Middle East and North Africa 150.73 329.64 113.75 2.62
Debt inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 1,136.02 845.29 1,048.38 1,462.65
Latin America and Caribbean 50.30 331.71 –62.97 39.55
East Asia Paciﬁc 214.92 219.90 233.03 272.45
South Asia 12.05 11.14 15.19 9.59
Europe and Central Asia 124.95 30.83 –1.73 127.13
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.65 44.17 33.10 –5.29
Middle East and North Africa 204.00 382.60 –138.69 435.74
Total equity inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 546.75 123.11 247.70 1,114.20
Latin America and Caribbean 84.05 65.86 38.08 139.61
East Asia Paciﬁc 269.07 125.27 226.90 454.84
South Asia 4.00 1.00 2.80 6.39
Europe and Central Asia 128.01 2.03 3.37 136.07
Sub-Saharan Africa 23.99 33.21 22.61 13.16
Middle East and North Africa 77.86 54.20 32.59 129.51
Total equity and debt inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 1,636.23 943.80 1,277.15 2,501.27
Latin America and Caribbean 82.66 348.16 –41.51 92.47
East Asia Paciﬁc 376.36 324.29 384.29 545.35
South Asia 14.12 11.74 16.31 13.43
Europe and Central Asia 209.95 31.64 –0.60 229.18
Sub-Saharan Africa 30.23 56.37 42.61 0.17
Middle East and North Africa 258.08 417.04 –117.95 528.89
Notes: Inﬂows of each category correspond to foreign claims on domestic capital (liability)
divided by population. Data are from IMF in 1995 U.S. dollars. Inﬂows of total equity repre-
sent the sum of FDI and portfolio equity investment. FDI data are for 72 countries; portfo-
lio data are for 68 countries, and debt data are for 122 countries.than ﬂows of equity.23 On the other hand, we would like to capture market
decisions.24 Ideally, we would like to use all of the private capital ﬂows and
abstract from the public part of debt ﬂows, but these data are not available.
The IFS data include both private and public issuers and holders of debt
securities. Although the data are further divided by monetary authorities,
general government, banks, and other sectors, this information is unfortu-
nately not available for most countries for long periods of time. In addi-
tion, it is diﬃcult to divide the available data by private/public creditor and
debtor.25 On the other hand, one might fear that excluding debt inﬂows to-
tally will reduce measures of capital inﬂows for countries with limited
stock market development and/or for countries that receive low levels of
FDI, which in turn might bias our results. We argue that the role of total
equity (direct and portfolio) ﬂows for the developing countries is not small
at all. For the developing countries, average inﬂows of FDI per capita grew
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Table 1.3 Volatility of inﬂows of capital, 1970–2000 (per capita U.S. dollars;
sample: 122 countries)
Standard 
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Volatility of FDI inﬂows 1.03 2.64 0.12 22.35
Volatility of portfolio equity inﬂows 0.78 0.43 0.16 2.29
Volatility of debt inﬂows 0.74 0.43 0.14 4.42
Volatility of total equity inﬂows 1.02 2.58 0.12 22.35
Volatility of total equity and debt inﬂows 0.75 0.68 0.07 7.26
Notes: Volatility of inﬂows is the standard deviation of the corresponding inﬂows per capita
divided by the average of the absolute value of the inﬂows and outﬂows of capital per capita
over time for each country. Data are from IMF in 1995 U.S. dollars. FDI inﬂows correspond
to Direct Investment in Reporting Economy (IFS line 78bed), which includes equity capital,
reinvested earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives associated with various inter-
company transactions between aﬃliated enterprises. Portfolio equity inﬂows correspond to
Equity Liabilities (line 78bmd), which includes shares, stock participations, and similar doc-
uments that usually denote ownership of equity. Data on inﬂows of debt include Debt Secu-
rities Liabilities (line 78bnd), which cover bonds, notes, and money market or negotiable debt
instruments; and Other Investment Liabilities (line 78bid), which include all ﬁnancial trans-
actions not covered by direct investment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other
assets. Inﬂows of total equity are the sum of FDI and portfolio equity investments. FDI data
are for 72 countries, portfolio data are for 68 countries, and debt data are for 122 countries.
23. Until the mid-1970s—following the shutting down of the international markets in the
1930s—debt ﬂows to most developing countries were generally restricted to international or-
ganizations/government-to-government loans. During the late 1970s, banks replaced govern-
ments of industrial countries as lenders to developing countries. After 1982, following the
debt crisis, oﬃcial creditors once again dominated lending to developing countries.
24. In many countries bank loans have usually been intermediated through ﬁnancial sys-
tems that often do not follow market incentives due to explicit or implicit government in-
volvement. See Henry and Lorentzen (2003) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
25. The World Bank’s Global Development Finance database, which focuses on the liabil-
ity side, divides debt data by the type of creditor (oﬃcial and private) but not by the type of
debtor. These data are available only for developing countries.Table 1.4 Volatility of inﬂows of capital by decade and region, 1970–2000 (per
capita U.S. dollars; sample: 122 countries)
1970–2000 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Volatility of FDI inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 0.58 0.30 0.33 0.39
Latin America and Caribbean 0.82 0.41 0.78 0.55
East Asia Paciﬁc 0.61 0.41 0.48 0.41
South Asia 0.53 n.a. 0.34 0.44
Europe and Central Asia 0.69 0.35 0.63 0.57
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.41 0.63 0.78 0.78
Middle East and North Africa 0.86 0.64 0.83 0.66
Volatility of portfolio equity inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 0.70 0.62 0.83 0.48
Latin America and Caribbean 0.92 0.70 3.85 0.74
East Asia Paciﬁc 0.68 0.42 0.49 0.72
South Asia 0.77 n.a. n.a. 0.77
Europe and Central Asia 0.75 n.a. 0.33 0.74
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.04 0.93 2.12 0.74
Middle East and North Africa 0.64 0.43 0.56 0.69
Volatility of debt inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 0.57 0.41 0.50 0.43
Latin America and Caribbean 0.86 0.52 0.85 0.63
East Asia Paciﬁc 1.04 0.35 0.64 0.53
South Asia 0.47 0.32 0.32 0.45
Europe and Central Asia 0.68 0.57 0.67 0.60
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.77 0.52 0.72 0.51
Middle East and North Africa 0.72 0.49 0.64 0.67
Volatility of total equity
United States, Japan, Western Europe 0.62 0.32 0.42 0.38
Latin America and Caribbean 0.79 0.38 0.71 0.44
East Asia Paciﬁc 0.60 0.42 0.48 0.42
South Asia 0.73 n.a. 0.41 0.58
Europe and Central Asia 0.64 0.35 0.58 0.53
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.39 0.62 0.77 0.71
Middle East and North Africa 0.81 0.65 0.79 0.64
Volatility of total equity and debt inﬂows
United States, Japan, Western Europe 0.51 0.34 0.44 0.37
Latin America and Caribbean 0.86 0.44 0.98 0.62
East Asia Paciﬁc 1.31 0.26 3.14 0.55
South Asia 0.46 0.31 0.31 0.44
Europe and Central Asia 0.63 0.72 0.66 0.52
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.76 0.45 0.79 0.52
Middle East and North Africa 0.76 0.48 0.62 0.68
Notes: Volatility of inﬂows is the standard deviation of the inﬂows per capita divided by the
average of the absolute value of the inﬂows and outﬂows of capital per capita over time for
each country. Data are from IMF in 1995 U.S. dollars. FDI data are for 72 countries; portfo-
lio data are for 68 countries, and debt data are for 122 countries.by 6.2 percent over the last thirty years and became the main source of
private capital during the 1990s. Average inﬂows of portfolio equity per
capita grew by 9.3 percent. Average inﬂows of debt per capita grew only by
3.3 percent. We nevertheless examine the role of debt inﬂows in our empir-
ical analysis for robustness.
Table 1.6 provides descriptive statistics for our regression sample of
forty-seven countries averaged over the sample period 1970–2000. Follow-
ing AKV, we use the initial level of human capital (years of total schooling
in total population) and institutional quality averaged over the sample pe-
riod as independent variables to capture the fundamentals of the economy.
We use the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) political safety vari-
ables as our measure of institutional quality. This composite index is the
sum of the indexes of government stability, internal conﬂict, external con-
ﬂict, no corruption, nonmilitarized politics, protection from religious ten-
sions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic account-
ability, and bureaucratic quality.
In the empirical capital ﬂow literature, distance has been used as a proxy
for the international capital market failures, mainly asymmetric informa-
tion.26 We construct a variable called distantness, which is the weighted
average of the distances from the capital city of a particular country to the
capital cities of the other countries, using the gross domestic product
(GDP) shares of the other countries as weights.27
We use additional variables on the right-hand side to capture domestic
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Table 1.5 Sample of countries for the regression analysis, 1970–2000
Argentina Cyprus Israel Pakistan Sri Lanka
Australiaa Czecy Republica Italya Papua New Guinea Swedena
Austriaa Denmarka Japana Paraguay Thailand
Bolivia Egypt Jordan The Philippines Tunisia
Brazil Estonia Kenya Polanda Turkeya
Cameroon Finlanda Koreaa Portugala United Statesa
Canadaa Francea Morocco Romania United Kingdoma
Chile Germanya The Netherlandsa Senegal
Colombia Hungarya New Zealanda South Africa
Costa Rica India Norwaya Spaina
Note: Base sample of 47 countries for the regression analysis.
aOECD member country.
26. Portes and Rey (2005) use a similar interpretation of distance in the context of bilateral
capital ﬂows, as do Wei and Wu (2002) in analyzing the determinants of FDI and bank lend-
ing. See also Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001).
27. We construct this variable following Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003). We
use Arcview software to get the latitude and longitude of each capital city and calculate the
great arc distance between each pair. The GDP weights capture the positive relationship be-
tween trade volume and GDP.distortions associated with government policies and also with the ﬁnancial
structure of the economy. These are inﬂation volatility, capital controls,
sovereign risk, corporate tax, and bank credit, all averaged over the sample
period. Inﬂation volatility captures macroeconomic instability. It is mea-
sured as the standard deviation divided by the mean of the inﬂation rate
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Table 1.6 Descriptive statistics
Standard 
Sample Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Inﬂows of total equity per capita 47 173.81 199.93 1.68 697.97
Volatility of inﬂows of total equity per capita 47 1.50 0.57 0.71 3.14
Institutional quality 47 5.56 1.11 3.41 7.27
Human capital 47 4.65 2.64 0.54 9.55
Distantness (000 km) 47 7.64 2.48 5.13 14.06
Inﬂation volatility 47 0.90 0.71 0.30 4.64
Capital controls 47 1.53 0.26 1.00 1.96
GDP per capita ($000) 47 6.72 6.99 0.21 23.46
Bank credit ($ total credit) 45 83.49 11.95 54.34 98.50
Sovereign risk 36 6.69 5.06 1.00 13.86
Corporate taxes (%) 34 33.76 4.83 18.00 42.00
French legal origin 47 0.46 0.51 0.00 1.00
British legal origin 47 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00
Notes: Inﬂows are calculated as net change in investment liabilities in a reporting economy. Total equity
inﬂows are the sum of portfolio and foreign investment inﬂows. Volatility is calculated as the normalized
standard deviation of the inﬂows. Normalization is performed by average gross ﬂows. Institutional qual-
ity is represented by the composite political safety index calculated as the sum of all the rating compo-
nents from International Country Risk Guide(PRS Group 2001), averaged from 1984 to 2000, divided by
10. The index takes values from 0 to 76 for each country, where a higher score means lower risk. Human
capital is measured as the average years of total schooling over 25 years old in the total population, in
1970. Distantness is the weighted average of the distances in thousands of kilometers from the capital
city of the particular country to the capital cities of the other countries, using the GDP shares of the
other countries as weights, averaged from 1970 to 2000. Inﬂation volatility is the standard deviation of
the annual CPI inﬂation over the 1970–2000 normalized by the average inﬂation for that period. Capi-
tal controls is an index calculated as the mean value of the four dummy variables—exchange arrange-
ments, payments restrictions on current transactions, and capital transactions, repatriation require-
ments for export proceeds, averaged from 1971 to 2000; it takes a value between 1 and 2. GDP per capita
is measured in per capita 1995 U.S. dollars. Bank credit is claims of deposit money banks on nonﬁnan-
cial domestic sectors as share of claims of central bank and deposit money banks on nonﬁnancial do-
mestic sectors, in percent, average from 1970 to 2000 (without outliers Bolivia and Hungary). Sovereign
risk is an index based on Standard & Poor’s long term foreign currency denominated sovereign debt rat-
ings. Index ranges from 1, an obligor rated AAA, to 23, an obligor rated SD (selective default). Data are
available for Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Den-
mark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Korea, Mo-
rocco, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Paraguay, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States. Corporate taxes represents the cor-
porate income tax rate, single year value varying by country. Data are available for Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,
Tunisia, and the United States. French and British legal origin are dummy variables taking the value of
1 if a country’s legal code can be traced to French civil law or British common law legal tradition.over the sample period. Normalization by mean is crucial given the diﬀer-
ences in average inﬂation levels across time for the diﬀerent countries. Our
capital controls measure is the average of four dummy variables con-
structed using data collected by the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Ar-
rangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These dummy vari-
ables are exchange arrangements, payments restrictions on current
transactions and on capital transactions, and repatriation requirements
for export proceeds. Bank credit is the share of credit provided by deposit
money banks, which include commercial banks and other ﬁnancial insti-
tutions entitled to accept deposits from the public.28
It is clear that there is extensive cross-sectional variation on these vari-
ables. The institutional quality index varies from 3.4 to 7.3 with a mean of
5.5. Human capital varies from 1 to 10 years with a mean of 4.7 years. Table
1.7 presents the correlation matrix. Some of our independent variables are
highly correlated, such as institutional quality and human capital, and
sovereign risk and institutional quality. Hence, it is essential to employ a
multiple-regression framework with many robustness tests.29
Table 1.8 shows the results. Institutional quality, human capital, and
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28. In AKV we used a wider range of additional right-hand-side variables, such as GDP per
capita, inﬂation, government consumption, government budget, trade openness (share of ex-
ports plus imports in GDP), restrictions on foreign investment, incentives on foreign invest-
ment, government infrastructure (percent of paved roads), stock market capitalization,
reuters (number of times the country’s name is mentioned in Reuters), foreign banks (share of
foreign banks in total), and accounting (an index of accounting standards of corporate ﬁrms).
In that work, out of all these variables only sovereign risk, corporate tax, and bank credit were
signiﬁcant depending on the speciﬁcation. Hence, we check their role here again.
29. We refer the reader to AKV for a sensitivity analysis with a wider range of variables.
Table 1.7 Correlation matrix
Human capital Distantness
Institutional quality 0.69 –0.41
Human capital –0.19
Inﬂation Capital  Bank  Sovereign  Corporate 
volatility controls credit risk ratings tax
No. of observations 47 47 45 36 34
Institutional quality –0.09 –0.64 0.61 –0.85 –0.20
Human capital 0.17 –0.51 0.37 –0.68 –0.18
Distantness 0.24 0.30 –0.43 0.53 0.16
Notes:Correlations are for the logarithm of the variables. Panel A reports the correlation ma-
trix for the main regressions with the 47-country sample. Panel B reports the correlation be-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.distantness are all important determinants of capital inﬂows.30 This result
holds regardless of including debt inﬂows on the left-hand side, as shown
in columns (1) and (2). Other potential determinants turn out to be in-
signiﬁcant.31Sovereign risk is borderline signiﬁcant when distantness is left
out. Obviously, both are capturing information/market frictions. Figure
1.7 shows the partial correlation plot for the institutional quality variable
for the regression shown in column (2) of table 1.8. The slope of the ﬁtted
line is 5.56, as shown in that column.32The strong positive relation between
institutional quality and the inﬂows of capital per capita is evidently not
due to the outliers.
What about endogeneity? It is possible that capital inﬂows aﬀect the in-
stitutional quality of a country. More inﬂows can generate incentives to re-
form and create an investor-friendly environment by improving property
rights. Moreover, because most institutional quality measures are con-
structed ex post, analysts might have a natural bias toward “assigning” bet-
ter institutions to countries with higher capital inﬂows. One way to solve
this problem is to ﬁnd variables not subject to reverse causality that can ac-
count for the institutional variation.33 AKV instrument institutional qual-
ity with its historical determinants mainly with settler mortality rates from
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002; hereafter AJR) and show
that the eﬀect of institutional quality on capital inﬂows is causal.34AJR ar-
gue that the historical mortality rates of European settlers in colonized
countries are a good instrument for current institutions of former colonies
since if the European settlement there was discouraged by diseases then the
Europeans set up worse institutions.
In this paper we investigate whether there is any direct eﬀect of some
other historical determinants of institutions, such as legal origins and legal
system. La Porta et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of historical legal
origins in shaping current ﬁnancial institutions. They examine the eﬀect of
legal origin on the laws governing investor protection, the enforcement of
these laws, and the extent of concentration of ﬁrm ownership across coun-
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30. In AKV, we also explored the role of each of the components of the composite index
that is used as a proxy for institutional quality. We ﬁnd institutional quality indicators that are
closer proxies of property rights protection, such as the no-corruption index and protection
from expropriation, to be important determinants of capital inﬂows.
31. We also investigate the eﬀect of the exchange rate regime. The results remain the same.
32. We ﬁrst regressed inﬂows of capital per capita on human capital and distantness. We
took the residuals and regressed them on the residuals from a regression of institutional qual-
ity on human capital and distantness. The Frisch-Waugh theorem says the coeﬃcient from
this regression is exactly the same as the one in the multiple regression. The ﬁgure plots these
two sets of residuals against each other.
33. Another source of endogeneity can come from the possibility that both inﬂows and in-
stitutional quality might be determined by an omitted third factor. We believe the extensive
robustness analysis that is undertaken in AKV shows that this is not the case.
34. AKV also use other instruments, such as historical indicators of regime type and polit-
ical constraints to the executive power from the polity data set and the fraction of the popu-
lation speaking English.Fig. 1.7 Regression of inﬂows of capital per capita on institutional quality after
controlling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors other than insti-
tutional quality and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the residuals from a re-
gression of institutional quality on the other regressors (including a constant in both regres-
sions). The coeﬃcient on institutional quality is then exactly the same as the coeﬃcient in the
multiple regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set in the ﬁgure. In-
ﬂows of capital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.
tries. Most countries’ legal rules, either through colonialism, conquest, or
outright borrowing, can be traced to one of four distinct European legal
systems: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, and
Scandinavian civil law. These legal-origin variables have been adopted as
exogenous determinants of institutional quality, in particular for ﬁnancial
institutions, in the economic growth literature. On the other hand, AJR
claim that legal origin is a weak instrument for institutional quality, in par-
ticular for institutions that protect property rights. They claim it is hard tomake a case that legal origins do not have any direct eﬀect on the relevant
outcome variables such as income levels.35 Thus we investigate whether le-
gal origins have a direct eﬀect on capital inﬂows in addition to their partial
eﬀect on institutional quality by adding legal origin as an additional right-
hand-side variable.
Table 1.9 shows the results. As shown in columns (1)–(4), French legal
origin has a negative signiﬁcant eﬀect and British legal origin has a posi-
tive signiﬁcant eﬀect. It seems these eﬀects are ﬁrst order in addition to in-
stitutions. If institutional quality is left out from the regressions, the British
legal origin variable is signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level. We do not
tabulate the details, but we found in our data that British legal origin is neg-
atively correlated with institutions, and this leads to a downward bias in
British legal origin when institutional quality is omitted. Column (5) dis-
plays an instrumental variables (IV) regression that instruments institu-
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35. AJR stress that successful instruments have to be theoretically excludable from the em-
pirical model used by the econometrician and that undertaking overidentiﬁcation tests is not
enough. In addition, overidentiﬁcation tests have low power in general. AJR show that in
their ﬁrst-stage regression French legal origin is associated with worse institutions. But in
their second-stage regression, where French legal origin is included as one of the explanatory
variables and institutions are instrumented with settler mortality rates, French legal origin
has a positive eﬀect on income. The net eﬀect of this variable on income (directly and indi-
rectly via institutional quality) is positive.
Table 1.9 OLS regression of capital inﬂows per capita: Historical legal origins
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Countries 47 47 47 47 21 21
Institutional quality 5.04∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ 6.91∗∗∗ 4.77∗∗∗
(5.01) (5.69) (2.90) (5.84)
Human capital 0.39∗ 0.45∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 0.01 0.47∗
(1.90) (2.32) (5.96) (5.99) (1.40) (1.70)
Distantness –0.97∗ –1.44∗∗∗ –1.90∗∗∗ –2.31∗∗∗ –0.12 –0.28
(–1.81) (–2.77) (–2.64) (–3.34) (–0.20) (–0.34)
French legal origin –0.56∗∗ –0.57∗∗
(–2.01) (–1.99)
British legal origin 0.84∗∗ 0.63∗ 0.94∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(2.51) (1.64) (2.27) (2.50)
R2 0.64 0.66 0.51 0.51 0.80 0.84
Notes: Dependent variable: inﬂows of total equity per capita. All regressions include a constant and are
estimated by OLS with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses. Inﬂows
of total equity include inﬂows of foreign and portfolio equity investment. All right-hand-side variables
are in logs except the legal origin variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.tions with log settler mortality rates from AJR, which is only available for
twenty-one ex-colonies in our sample.36If there is a direct eﬀect of legal ori-
gin on capital inﬂows we expect it to be signiﬁcant in this regression. We
ﬁnd this to be the case.37 Column (5) also reestablishes the causal eﬀect of
institutions, which is already shown by AKV. Column (6) reports the corre-
sponding ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for comparison. We only
show the IV regression in column (5) with British legal origin since our
sample is composed of onlyBritish and French legal origin countries. Thus,
the corresponding IV regression with French legal origin is exactly the
same as in column (5) with a reverse sign on the French legal origin vari-
able.38 We also investigated the direct eﬀect of the variables proposed by
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) to capture investor protection, such as share-
holder rights, and found similar results. The partial correlation plots given
in ﬁgures 1.8 and 1.9show that the signiﬁcant eﬀects of French and British
legal origins are not due to the outliers but rather are driven by the coun-
tries one would expect, such as Turkey for French origin and Australia
for British origin.
1.4.2 Determinants of Changes in Capital Flows
Our results thus far suggest that institutional quality has a ﬁrst-order
eﬀect over policies in explaining the pattern of capital ﬂows in the period
1970–2000. Is there any role left for policies? Can a country that improves
its institutions or macroeconomic policies expect to receive more inﬂows?
To investigate these questions we run change regressions. We calculate the
change in inﬂows per capita as the diﬀerence between average capital in-
ﬂows per capita over 1970–93 and average capital inﬂows per capita over
1994–2000. We did the same for the independent variables, and we regress
changes on changes. The reason for this division of the sample is the fact
that visible improvements, if any, in institutional variables occur in the late
1990s, as shown in ﬁgure 1.10.39
The results are given in table 1.10. We only consider the twenty-three
developing countries out of our forty-seven-country sample, since for the
OECD the institutional changes are basically zero and this distorts the pic-
ture. The results suggest that a country that improves institutions, decreases
capital controls, and increases its growth is going to receive more capital in-
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36. The corresponding ﬁrst-stage regression reports a coeﬃcient of –0.21 on settler mor-
tality rates with a t-statistic of –4.09.
37. Note that this regression is an interpretable version of an overidentiﬁcation test.
38. Institutional quality is estimated to have a higher coeﬃcient in the IV regression since
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression corrects for the measurement error that causes at-
tenuation bias in the OLS regression.
39. At ﬁrst, we cut the sample in the middle and calculated the change from 1970–85 to
1986–2000. However, given the time-invariant nature of our variables, this way of dividing the
sample does not provide us with much variation.ﬂows.40 The change in institutions is not always very signiﬁcant, though.
This is not surprising given the small sample size and low time variation in
this variable. Of course, we have to interpret the results with caution since
most of these right-hand-side variables are endogenous, such as the change
in GDP per capita. An interesting result is the positive signiﬁcant distant-
Capital Flows in a Globalized World 47
Fig. 1.8 Regression of inﬂows of capital per capita on French legal origin control-
ling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors other than French
legal origin and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the residuals from a regression
of French legal origin on the other regressors (including a constant in both regressions). The
coeﬃcient on the French legal origin is then exactly the same as the coeﬃcient in the multiple
regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set in the ﬁgure. Inﬂows of cap-
ital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.
40. Note, however, that the IMF measure for capital controls does not control for the fact
that legal restrictions are sometimes circumvented. See Edwards (2001) for criticisms to the
use of this index.ness. This variable enters in levels since diﬀerencing this variable is going to
capture only the change in GDP weights. The result suggests that informa-
tion frictions have become less important for capital inﬂows in the 1990s
since even the “remote and distant countries” receive higher capital inﬂows
in the 1990s, which is exactly what we expect to ﬁnd. Overall, these results
suggest that there is a role for improved policy and institutions.
1.4.3 Determinants of Capital Flow Volatility
A natural intermediate step toward understanding the link between cap-
ital ﬂows and ﬁnancial crises is to look at the determinants of volatility of
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Fig. 1.9 Regression of inﬂows of capital per capita on British legal origin control-
ling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors other than British
legal origin and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the residuals from a regression
of British legal origin on the other regressors (including a constant in both regressions). The
coeﬃcient on the British legal origin is then exactly the same as the coeﬃcient in the multiple
regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set in the ﬁgure. Inﬂows of cap-
ital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.capital ﬂows. There have not been many empirical papers that look at the
determinants of capital ﬂow volatility. As a preliminary investigation of the
patterns in the data, we run cross-country regressions for the period 1970–
2000. We measure volatility as the standard deviation of inﬂows of total eq-
uity per capita divided by the mean gross ﬂows over the sample period.
Table 1.11 shows our results. We do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of institu-
tional quality on the volatility of the inﬂows of total equity. However, this
eﬀect is sensitive to inclusion of some other independent variables such as
sovereign risk and capital controls. We also ﬁnd the coeﬃcient of inﬂation
volatility to be positive and signiﬁcant. It appears that countries with lower
levels of inﬂation volatility tend to experience lower levels of uncertainty in
terms of the inﬂows of external capital. Bank credit is positive and signiﬁ-
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Fig. 1.10 Evolution of institutional quality (average of 47 countries)
Notes: Institutional quality index is a composite political safety index, which is the sum of all
the rating components from International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group 2001). The com-
ponents are as follows: Government stability is deﬁned as the government’s ability to carry
out its declared programs and its ability to stay in oﬃce. It ranges from 0 to 12. Internal con-
ﬂict is deﬁned as the political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on gov-
ernance. It ranges from 0 to 12. External conﬂict is the risk to the incumbent government from
foreign action, ranging from nonviolent external pressure to violent external pressure. It
ranges from 0 to 12. Noncorruption is an index of the degree of the noncorruption within the
political system. It ranges from 0 to 6. Militarized politics is the degree of protection from the
military involvement in politics. It ranges from 0 to 6. A religious tension is the degree of the
protection from religious tensions in the society. It ranges from 0 to 6. The law component of
the law and order index is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system;
the order component is the assessment of the popular observance of the law. It ranges from 0
to 6. Ethnic tensions are the degree of protection from the tensions attributable to racial, na-
tionality, or language divisions in the society. It ranges from 0 to 12. Democratic accounta-
bility ranges from 0 to 6, where a higher score represents stable democracies and lower scores
represents autocracies. Bureaucratic quality ranges from 0 to 4 and represents institutional
strength and quality of the bureaucracy.cant. This can be due to several reasons. First, as noted in the introduction
to the chapter, the literature has related high volatility of capital ﬂows and
currency crisis to bank fragility. Financial liberalization, when not fol-
lowed by proper regulation and supervision, can lead to both greater cap-
ital ﬂows intermediated through banks and greater bank credit and later to
abrupt reversals in capital ﬂows.41 Moreover, the positive correlation be-
tween bank credit and capital ﬂow volatility might be due to cronyism in
the banking sector.42 We also control for stock market capitalization and
trade openness, both of which come in as insigniﬁcant.43
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Table 1.10 OLS regression of changes in capital inﬂows: Developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Countries 23 23 23 23
  Institutional quality 1.58∗ 2.27∗ 1.45 1.25
(1.70) (1.61) (1.33) (1.52)
Distantness 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(3.34) (3.40) (3.80) (3.60)
  Capital controls –0.19∗∗∗ –0.21∗∗∗ –0.22∗∗∗ –0.20∗∗∗
(–4.73) (–4.20) (–4.41) (–4.90)
  GDP per capita 0.81∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(3.68) (3.14) (4.18) (3.19)
  Inﬂation volatility 0.17
(0.65)
  Human capital 0.22
(1.27)
  Bank credit 0.87
(1.49)
R2 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.79
Notes: Dependent variable: change in inﬂows of total equity per capita between the periods
of 1994–2000 and 1970–93. All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with
White’s correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses. Inﬂows of total equity
include inﬂows of foreign and portfolio equity investment. The sample of 23 developing coun-
tries includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Hungary,
India, Jordan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Ro-
mania, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and South Africa (Bolivia, Cyprus, Israel, and
South Korea are outliers and dropped).  represents the diﬀerence between the average value
of the corresponding variable between the periods of 1994–2000 and 1970–93.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
41. Henry and Lorentzen (2003) argue that liberalization of debt ﬂows exposes countries to
the risk of crises stemming from sudden changes in investors’ sentiments. Equity market lib-
eralizations, on the other hand, have promoted growth in almost every liberalizing country.
42. This ﬁnding is consistent with Wei (2000) and Wei and Wu (2002). The authors show
that corruption within a country increases the loan-FDI ratio.
43. Other measures of credit market and capital market development in general, such as liq-
uid liabilities and total value traded, are also insigniﬁcant.Figures 1.11–1.13 show the partial correlation plots for institutions, in-
ﬂation volatility, and bank credit with slopes –0.42, 0.24, and 0.37, respec-
tively, as shown in column (1) of table 1.11. Clearly, these signiﬁcant rela-
tions are not due to outliers and driven by volatile countries of Latin
America and Asia. The last two columns investigate the role of legal ori-
gins, which turn out to be insigniﬁcant. This phenomenon might be due to
the fact that they work their eﬀect via institutions.
Table 1.12looks at the issue of measuring volatility. Our results might be
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Table 1.11 OLS regression of volatility of capital inﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries 47 47 47 47 36 34 47 47
Institutional quality –0.42∗∗ –0.50∗ –0.47∗∗ –0.33 0.04 –0.47 –0.50∗ –0.44∗∗
(–2.29) (–1.76) (–2.55) (–1.55) (0.14) (–1.53) (–1.76) (–2.25)
Inﬂation volatility 0.24∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.19 0.26∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(2.41) (2.19) (2.45) (2.48) (1.57) (2.09) (2.19) (2.35)
Bank credit 0.37∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.42 0.62∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.38∗∗











French legal origin –0.07
(–0.91)
British legal origin –0.04
(–0.48)
R2 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.22 0.21
Notes: Dependent variable: volatility of inﬂows of total equity per capita. Volatility is calculated as nor-
malized standard deviation of inﬂows. Normalization is performed by average gross ﬂows. All regres-
sions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity. t-
statistics are in parentheses. Inﬂows of total equity include inﬂows of foreign and portfolio equity
investment. All right-hand-side variables are in logs except the legal origin variables. The 36-country
sample includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Korea,
Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Paraguay, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States. The 34-country sample in-
cludes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Korea,
Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, and the United States.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.due to the fact that some countries have liberalized their ﬁnancial accounts
over the last thirty years and received huge inﬂows. As a result, the mea-
sured volatility could increase because the volume and upward trend in
capital inﬂows may not be captured by our benchmark normalization. We
experiment with diﬀerent ways to deal with these problems: we use stan-
dard deviation of inﬂows, standard deviation of detrended inﬂows, and
normalized versions of these measures. In columns (1) and (3) volatility is
measured as the standard deviation of inﬂows. In columns (2) and (4), it is
normalized standard deviation of inﬂows. Normalization is performed by
the average gross ﬂows. In columns (5) and (7), it is the standard deviation
of detrended inﬂows. Detrending is performed by regressing inﬂows on a
constant and a linear trend and using residuals from that regression as a
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Fig. 1.11 Regression of volatility of inﬂows of capital per capita on institutions
controlling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the volatility of inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors other
than institutional quality and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the residuals
from a regression of institutional quality on the other regressors (including a constant in both
regressions). The coeﬃcient on the institutional quality is then exactly the same as the coeﬃ-
cient in the multiple regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set. In-
ﬂows of capital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.proxy for inﬂows. In columns (6) and (8) it is normalized standard devia-
tion of detrended inﬂows. Normalization is performed by the average gross
ﬂows.44 It is clear that detrending does not matter and what matters is nor-
malization. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) control for the level of inﬂows on
the right-hand side. The main conclusion is that normalization does a good
job of controlling the volume and trend eﬀects of the level of inﬂows. Fig-
ure 1.14 plots the partial correlation plot out of column (6), with slope
–0.44. Although this is a tighter ﬁt, there are no important diﬀerences rel-
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Fig. 1.12 Regression of volatility of inﬂows of capital per capita on inﬂation
volatility controlling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the volatility of inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors other
than inﬂation volatility and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the residuals from
a regression of inﬂation volatility on the other regressors (including a constant in both re-
gressions). The coeﬃcient on inﬂation volatility is then exactly the same as the coeﬃcient in
the multiple regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set in the ﬁgure.
Inﬂows of capital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.
44. We also investigated the eﬀect of a quadratic trend. The results were similar.ative to ﬁgure 1.11. Figure 1.15 plots the partial correlation from column
(1), with slope 11.56. Scandinavian countries evidently have high volatility
due to volume, and our normalization takes care of this.
Overall, the results suggest that institutional quality and macroeco-
nomic policy play an important role for capital ﬂow volatility. We should
note, however, that we are establishing correlations more than causality.
For example, inﬂation volatility is probably endogenous to the volatility of
capital inﬂows and to institutional quality. Higher volatility can also cause
an increase in bank credit or capital controls. Finding good instruments for
the policy variables is a rather diﬃcult task and not the focus of this study.
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Fig. 1.13 Regression of volatility of inﬂows of capital per capita on bank credit
controlling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the volatility of inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors other
than bank credit and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the residuals from a re-
gression of bank credit on the other regressors (including a constant in both regressions). The
coeﬃcient on the bank credit is then exactly the same as the coeﬃcient in the multiple regres-
sion. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set in the ﬁgure. Inﬂows of capital
per capita include direct and portfolio investment.1.5 Conclusions
Over the last thirty years, international capital ﬂows have experienced
tremendous growth. The surge in capital ﬂows and, in particular, the crises
of the last decade have revived the debate over the merits of international
capital mobility. Our objective in this paper has been to overview the main
stylized facts behind capital ﬂow mobility over the last thirty years and es-
tablish the empirical determinants of capital ﬂows and capital ﬂow volatil-
ity. We ﬁnd institutional quality to be an important determinant of capital
inﬂows. Historical legal origins have a direct eﬀect on capital inﬂows dur-
ing the period 1970–2000. Policy plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining
changes in the level of inﬂows and their volatility.
Appendix A
Data
Foreign direct investment: Direct Investment abroad (IFS line 78bdd) and
Direct Investment in Reporting Economy (line 78bed) include equity cap-
ital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives associated
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Table 1.12 OLS regression of volatility of capital inﬂows: Measurement issues
St. Dev./ St. Dev./ St. Dev. (dt1)/ St. Dev. (dt1)/
Volatility St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. (dt1) Mean St. Dev. (dt1) Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Institutional 11.56∗∗∗ –0.42∗∗ –3.37∗∗∗ –0.63∗∗∗ 8.54∗∗∗ –0.44∗∗ –2.81∗∗∗ –0.69∗∗∗
quality (4.26) (–2.29) (–2.77) (–2.99) (4.01) (–2.54) (–2.68) (–3.74)
Inﬂation –0.22 0.24∗∗ 0.46∗ 0.25∗∗ –0.21 0.13∗∗ 0.30 –0.15∗∗
volatility (–0.33) (2.41) (1.77) (2.51) (–0.43) (2.03) (1.45) (–2.20)
Bank credit 0.61 0.37∗∗ 1.26 0.38∗∗ 0.30 0.29∗∗ 0.79 0.30∗∗
(0.30) (2.22) (1.45) (2.30) (0.21) (2.15) (1.32) (2.18)
Inﬂows of  19.77∗∗∗ 0.28 15.04∗∗∗ 0.33∗
total equity (11.26) (1.15) (9.42) (1.72)
R2 0.44 0.20 0.89 0.22 0.40 0.16 0.85 0.19
Notes: Dependent variable: various estimates for volatility of inﬂows of total equity per capita. Volatility is calculated
as follows: for columns (1) and (3), standard deviation of inﬂows; (2) and (4), normalized standard deviation of inﬂows;
(5) and (7), standard deviation of detrended inﬂows divided by 100; (6) and (8), normalized standard deviation of de-
trended inﬂows divided by 100. All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White’s correction of
heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses. Inﬂows of total equity include inﬂows of foreign and portfolio equity
investment. All variables are in logs except for inﬂows of total equity per capita.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.with various intercompany transactions between aﬃliated enterprises. Ex-
cluded are inﬂows of direct investment capital into the reporting economy
for exceptional ﬁnancing such as debt-for-equity swaps. We include only
countries with data for both direct investment abroad and direct invest-
ment in the reporting economy.
Portfolio equity investment: Equity Securities Assets (IFS line 78bkd)
and Equity Securities Liabilities (line 78bmd) include shares, stock partic-
ipations, and similar documents (such as American depository receipts)
that usually denote ownership of equity. These are divided into monetary
authorities, general government, banks, and other sectors. We calculate
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Fig. 1.14 Regression of normalized volatility (deviation from the trend) of inﬂows
of capital per capita on institutions controlling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the volatility of net inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors
other than institutional quality and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the resid-
uals from a regression of institutional quality on the other regressors (including a constant in
both regressions). The coeﬃcient on the institutional quality is then exactly the same as the
coeﬃcient in the multiple regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set
in the ﬁgure. Inﬂows of capital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.net portfolio equity ﬂows only for countries with data for both equity se-
curity assets and debt security liabilities.
Debt ﬂows: Debt Securities Assets (IFS line 78bld) and Debt Securities
Liabilities (line 78bnd) cover (a) bonds, debentures, notes, and so on (di-
vided into monetary authorities, general government, banks, and other
sectors) and (b) money market or negotiable debt instruments (divided into
monetary authorities, general government, banks, and other sectors).
Other investment assets (line 78bhd) and other investment liabilities (line
78bid) include all ﬁnancial transactions not covered in direct investment,
portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets. Major cate-
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Fig. 1.15 Regression of volatility (not normalized) of inﬂows of capital per capita
on institutions controlling for other regressors
Notes: We ﬁrst regressed the volatility of net inﬂows of capital per capita on the regressors
other than institutional quality and took the residuals, which we then regressed on the resid-
uals from a regression of institutional quality on the other regressors (including a constant in
both regressions). The coeﬃcient on the institutional quality is then exactly the same as the
coeﬃcient in the multiple regression. We plot the ﬁrst set of residuals against the second set
in the ﬁgure. Inﬂows of capital per capita include direct and portfolio investment.gories are trade credits, loans (divided into monetary authorities, general
government, and banks), transactions in currency and deposits (monetary
authorities, general government, and banks), and other assets (monetary
authorities, general government, and banks). We ﬁrst calculate total debt
assets as the sum of debt securities assets and other investment assets; to-
tal debt liabilities correspond to the sum of debt securities liabilities and
other investment liabilities. We calculate net total debt ﬂows only for coun-
tries that had information for both total debt liabilities and total debt as-
sets.
Total equity ﬂows:Sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity
ﬂows.
Volatility of inﬂows: Standard deviation of the corresponding inﬂows
per capita divided by the average of the absolute value of the inﬂows and
outﬂows of capital per capita.
Independent Variables
Bank credit, 1970–2000:Average value of claims of deposit money banks
on nonﬁnancial domestic sectors as share of claims of central bank and de-
posit money banks on nonﬁnancial domestic sectors, in percent.
Capital controls, 1971–97: The mean value of four dummy variables: (a)
exchange arrangements, separate exchange rates for some or all capital
transactions and/or some or all invisibles; (b) payment restrictions, restric-
tions on payments for current transactions; (c) payment restrictions, re-
strictions on payments for capital transactions; and (d) surrender or repa-
triation requirements for export proceeds. From International Monetary
Fund Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(various issues).
Corporate taxes: Corporate tax rates from PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) for 1990–97, from Wei (2000).
Distance: Thousands of kilometers, from Arcview 3.x software.
GDP per capita, 1971–2000: Shown in 1995 U.S. dollars; from World
Bank World Development Indicators (2002).
Human capital, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995:Average years of sec-
ondary, higher, and total schooling in the total population over twenty-ﬁve
years old. From World Bank (2002).
Legal origin: Origin of a country’s formal legal code: English common
law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. From
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998).
Inﬂation rate: Annual CPI inﬂation (World Bank 2002).
Inﬂation volatility: Standard deviation of inﬂation rate over the sample
period divided by the corresponding mean.
Institutional quality: Composite political safety, 1984–98: Sum of all the
rating components from International Country Risk Guideexcept for socio-
economic conditions and investment proﬁle. Average yearly rating from 0
58 Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovychto 76, with a higher score meaning lower risk. Data from the Political Risk
Services (PRS) Group (2001).
Government stability, 1984–98: The government’s ability to carry out its
declared program(s), and its ability to stay in oﬃce. Average yearly rating
from 0 to 12, with a higher score meaning lower risk. Data from PRS
Group (2001).
Internal conﬂict, 1984–98:Political violence in the country and its actual
or potential impact on governance. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, with
a higher score meaning lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
External conﬂict, 1984–98:Assessment both of the risk to the incumbent
government from foreign action, ranging from nonviolent external pres-
sure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territo-
rial disputes, sanctions, etc.) to violent external pressure (cross-border
conﬂicts to all-out war). Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, with a higher
score meaning lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Noncorruption index, 1984–98: Assessment of corruption within the
political system. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score
means lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Nonmilitarized politics, 1984–98: Protection from the military involve-
ment in politics. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, with a higher score
meaning lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Protection from religious tensions, 1984–98:Protection from the religious
tensions in society. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, with a higher score
meaning lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Law and order, 1984–98: The law subcomponent is an assessment of the
strength and impartiality of the legal system; the order subcomponent is an
assessment of popular observance of the law. Average yearly rating from 0
to 6, with a higher score meaning lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Protection from ethnic tensions, 1984–98: Assessment of the degree of
tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language di-
visions. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, with a higher score meaning
lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Democratic accountability, 1984–98: Average yearly rating from 0 to 6,
with a higher score meaning lower risk. In general, the highest number of
risk points is assigned to alternating democracies, while the lowest number
of risk points is assigned to autarchies. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Quality of bureaucracy, 1984–98: Institutional strength and quality of
the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions
of policy when governments change. Average yearly rating from 0 to 4, with
a higher score meaning lower risk. Data from PRS Group (2001).
Protection from government repudiation of contracts, 1982–95: Average
yearly rating from 0 to 10, with a higher score meaning lower risk. Data
from IRIS time series of PRS Group (2001).
Protection from expropriation, 1984–98: Average yearly rating from 0 to 
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PRS Group (2001).
Sovereign risk:Index based on Standard & Poor’s long-term foreign cur-
rency denominated sovereign debt ratings, average from 1971 to 1997. In-
dex ranges from 1 (an obligor rated AAA) to 23 (an obligor rated SD [se-
lective default]).
Appendix B
Table 1B.1 Sample countries: Total equity data
All countries 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Algeria Algeria Algeria Algeria
Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina
Australia Australia Australia Australia
Austria Austria Austria Austria
Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain
Bene-Lux Bene-Lux Bene-Lux Bene-Lux
Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia
Botswana Botswana Botswana Botswana
Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Burundi (starts 1989) Burundi
Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon
Canada Canada Canada Canada
Central African  Central African  Central African  Central African 
Republic Republic Republic Republic
Chad Chad Chad Chad
Chile Chile Chile Chile
China (starts 1982) China China
Colombia Colombia Colombia Colombia
Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica
Cyprus (starts 1985) Cyprus Cyprus
Czech Republic Czech Republic
(starts 1993)
Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark
Egypt, Arab Republic Egypt, Arab Republic Egypt, Arab Republic Egypt, Arab Republic
Estonia (starts 1993) Estonia
Fiji Fiji Fiji Fiji
Finland Finland Finland Finland
France France France France
Gabon Gabon Gabon Gabon
Germany Germany Germany Germany
Hungary (starts 1992) Hungary
India (starts 1993) India
Israel Israel Israel Israel
Italy Italy Italy Italy
Japan Japan Japan Japan
Jordan Jordan Jordan Jordan
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All countries 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya
Korea, Republic Korea, Republic Korea, Republic Korea, Republic
Kuwait (starts 1993) Kuwait
Latvia (starts 1992) Latvia
Libya Libya Libya Libya
Mauritania (not available  Mauritania Mauritania
for 1990s)
Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius
Morocco (starts 1991) Morocco
Namibia (starts 1989) Namibia
Netherlands, The Netherlands, The Netherlands, The Netherlands, The
New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand
Niger Niger Niger Niger
Norway Norway Norway Norway
Pakistan (starts 1984) Pakistan Pakistan
Papua New Guinea (not 
available after 1991) Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea
Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay
Philippines, The Philippines, The
(starts 1993)
Poland Poland Poland Poland
Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal
Romania (starts 1991) Romania
Senegal Senegal Senegal Senegal
Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
Slovak Republic Slovak Republic
(starts 1992)
Slovenia (starts 1992) Slovenia
South Africa (starts 1985) South Africa South Africa
Spain Spain Spain Spain
Sri Lanka (starts 1985) Sri Lanka Sri Lanka
Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland
Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden
Switzerland (starts 1982) Switzerland Switzerland
Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago
(starts 1983)
Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia
Turkey (starts 1987) Turkey Turkey
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
United States United States United States United States
Uruguay (starts 1986) Uruguay Uruguay
Notes: Total equity data are the sum of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity investment
data. Countries for which either FDI or portfolio equity investment data are available are included in the
sample. Countries in italics have data only for certain periods, as indicated in the table. Countries in bold
have data for both equity and debt ﬂows throughout the whole sample period. FDI data correspond to
Direct Investments Abroad (IFS line 78bdd) and Direct Investments in Reporting Economy (line 78bed)
and include equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and ﬁnancial derivatives associated with
various intercompany transactions between aﬃliated enterprises. Portfolio equity investments corre-
spond to Equity Security Assets (line 78bkd) and Equity Securities Liabilities (line 78bmd) and include
shares, stock participations, and similar documents that usually denote ownership of equity. Data taken
from IMF (2001).Table 1B.2 Sample countries: Debt data
All countries 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Albania (starts 1992) Albania
Algeria (1977–91) Algeria Algeria
Angola Angola Angola Angola
Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina
Australia Australia Australia Australia
Austria Austria Austria Austria
Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain
Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
Belarus (starts 1993) Belarus
Bene-Lux Bene-Lux Bene-Lux Bene-Lux
Benin Benin Benin Benin
Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia
Botswana Botswana Botswana Botswana
Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil
Bulgaria (starts 1980) Bulgaria Bulgaria
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia
Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon
Canada Canada Canada Canada
Central African  Central African  Central African 
Republic Republic Republic
Chad Chad Chad Chad
Chile Chile Chile Chile
China (starts 1982) China China
Colombia Colombia Colombia Colombia
Comoros (starts 1983) Comoros Comoros
Congo, Republic Congo, Republic Congo, Republic Congo, Republic
Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica
Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia (starts 1993) Croatia
Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus
Czech Republic (starts 1993) Czech Republic
Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Republic Egypt, Arab Republic Egypt, Arab Republic Egypt, Arab Republic
El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador
Eritrea (starts 1992) Eritrea
Estonia (starts 1992) Estonia 
Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia
Fiji Fiji Fiji Fiji
Finland Finland Finland Finland
France France France France
Gabon Gabon Gabon Gabon
Gambia Gambia Gambia Gambia
Germany Germany Germany Germany
Ghana Ghana Ghana Ghana
Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala
Guinea (starts 1987) Guinea GuineaTable 1B.2 (continued)
All countries 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Guyana (starts 1992) Guyana
Haiti Haiti Haiti Haiti
Honduras Honduras Honduras Honduras
Hungary (starts 1982) Hungary Hungary
India India India India
Iran, Islamic Republic Iran, Islamic Republic Iran, Islamic Republic Iran, Islamic Republic
Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland
Israel Israel Israel Israel
Italy Italy Italy Italy
Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica
Japan Japan Japan Japan
Jordan Jordan Jordan Jordan
Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya
Korea, Republic Korea, Republic Korea, Republic Korea, Republic
Kuwait Kuwait Kuwait Kuwait
Lao PDR (starts 1989) Lao PDR
Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia
Lesotho Lesotho Lesotho Lesotho
Libya Libya Libya Libya
Lithuania (starts 1993) Lithuania
Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar
Malawi Malawi Malawi Malawi
Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia
Mali Mali Mali Mali
Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania
Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius Mauritius
Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico
Mongolia (starts 1990) Mongolia
Morocco Morocco Morocco Morocco
Namibia (starts 1990) Namibia Namibia Namibia
Nepal Nepal Nepal Nepal
Netherlands, The Netherlands, The Netherlands, The Netherlands, The
New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand
Nicaragua (starts 1991) Nicaragua
Niger Niger Niger Niger
Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria
Norway Norway Norway Norway
Oman Oman Oman Oman
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
Panama Panama Panama Panama
Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea
Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay
Peru (starts 1985) Peru Peru
Philippines, The Philippines, The Philippines, The Philippines, The
Poland Poland Poland Poland
Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal
Romania Romania Romania Romania
Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda
(continued)Table 1B.2 (continued)
All countries 1970–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
Senegal Senegal Senegal Senegal
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone
Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
Slovak Republic (starts 1993) Slovak Republic
Slovenia (starts 1992) Slovenia
South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa
Spain Spain Spain Spain
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka
Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan
Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland Swaziland
Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland
Syria Syria Syria Syria
Tanzania (starts 1993) Tanzania
Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand
Togo Togo Togo Togo
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia
Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey
Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
United States United States United States United States
Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay
Zambia Zambia Zambia Zambia
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
Notes: Countries in italics have data only for certain periods, as indicated in the table. Countries in bold
have data for both equity (FDI and portfolio equity investments) and debt ﬂows throughout the whole
sample period. Debt data correspond to Debt Securities Assets (IFS line 78bld) and Debt Securities Li-
abilities (line 78bnd), which cover bonds, notes, and money market or negotiable debt instruments; other
investment assets (line 78bhd); and other investments liabilities (line 78bid), which include all ﬁnancial
transactions not covered in direct investment, portfolio investment, ﬁnancial derivatives, or other assets.
Data taken from IMF (2001).References
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Comment Gerd Häusler
The paper notes in the introduction that there are two important facts
about capital ﬂows in the period 1970–2000:
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Gerd Häusler is a vice chairman and a managing director at Lazard.• Capital does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries (the “Lucas para-
dox”).
• In fact, net capital ﬂows have been negative for emerging market (EM)
countries in recent years, as noted in chapter 4 of the September 2004
issue of the Global Financial Stability Report of the International
Monetary Fund. Rather, EM economies focused on reducing debt and
building up reserves as a self-insurance against global factors. This
risk appetite was also mirrored in the corporate sector, where corpo-
rations focused on repairing their balance sheet.
I would add that the period 1970–2000 was one that could be characterized
by mature markets seeking to diversify rather than one of “development”
ﬁnance (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). But is the Lucas paradox—the fact
that capital did not ﬂow from rich to poor countries—really a paradox? I
will return to this question.
On a diﬀerent point, I would also like to note that the title of the paper is
misleading in its generality. Although it is entitled “Capital Flows in a Glob-
alized World,” the paper does not cover debt ﬂows, which is a very impor-
tant asset class and component of capital ﬂows. The authors focus on equity
ﬂows and argue about lack of quality in debt data. It is unclear to me if eq-
uity data are better. Moreover, as shown in the paper’s ﬁgures 1.1 and 1.2,
debt ﬂows are a big—albeit declining in the late 1990s—part of the capital
ﬂows story. I should also point out here that Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)
show that the Lucas paradox can be easily explained with credit and politi-
cal risk—especially for countries that they describe as “serial defaulters.”
Let me now turn to the main focus of my discussion. The Lucas paradox
is not really a paradox at all. At a very basic level, what drives capital ﬂows
is one common criterion that banks and other lenders employ toward all
types of borrowers. At times they are so risk averse that they ﬂock toward
the best risk.
An important element that is missing from the paper is a discussion of
the behavior of the supply side:
• The authors’ list of determinants of capital inﬂows focuses only on
(recipient) country characteristics, not on changes in the supply of
funds.
• A key change in the ﬁnancial landscape over the past two decades has
been the growth of institutional investors, which are missing from the
paper (see ﬁg. 1C.1).
• The activities of institutional investors (and the decline in banking ac-
tivities) have been changing the supply of capital ﬂows in fundamen-
tal ways:
—For EM countries, there was a sharp shift in the investor base in the
second half of the 1990s (as shown in the September 2003 Global Fi-
nancial Stability Report, chap. 4).
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behind the “diversiﬁcation” factors in determining capital ﬂows
rather than “development” ﬁnance. Uncorrelated assetsis the catch-
phrase here (more on this below).
—Diversiﬁcation goes beyond mature markets: low returns in mature
markets and demographic trends will lead to more rich-to-poor
capital ﬂows.
• Global ﬁnancial assets held by private nonbank institutional investors
have more than doubled in the past ten years and more than tripled in
the past ﬁfteen years, to reach about US$40 trillion in a handful of the
largest mature markets. Capital funds are expected to continue to
grow at a rapid pace (demographic trends necessitate pension reforms
that are expected to create more and larger asset gatherers). One only
needs to look at what is happening in Europe or Japan, or in the dis-
cussion on Social Security reform in the United States. Putting aside
the policy debate for a moment on deﬁned beneﬁt versus deﬁned con-
tribution systems, in Europe informal systems are developing already
as families accumulate additional savings to top oﬀ social security.
• Changes in the asset allocation decisions of institutional investors will
have an increasingly important impact on capital ﬂows across asset
classes and across national borders, as well as asset prices. Sustained
diﬀerences in growth rates—such as, for example, low rates for Europe
and Japan while the United States and emerging Asia are growing at
signiﬁcantly faster rates—will drive asset allocation to the point where
returns promise to be higher. Both institutional funds and personal
savings will seek to maximize risk-adjusted returns in an increasingly
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Fig. 1C.1 Group of seven: Financial instruments outstanding and institutional 
investor assets (percentage of GDP)globalized ﬁnancial system by diversifying their holdings in uncorre-
lated assets and returns. I should note here that I use the phrase “in-
stitutional investors” loosely. The increase of personal savings will
mostly be through institutional investors.
• One corollary to these developments is that a relatively small change
in the asset allocation of funds—given their enormous relative size—
may aﬀect global ﬁnancial stability and, more speciﬁcally, have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the cost of external funding for EM countries.
• As EM countries mature, which includes opening their capital ac-
counts over time, ﬁnancial market integration will intensify, and these
countries’ growing ﬁnancial sectors will increasingly compete for,
open to, and receive from the global pool of capital.
As the global ﬁnancial markets evolve in the context of demographic de-
velopments and regulatory changes, there will be some adjustment prob-
lems. As I already mentioned, aging societies will behave like rentiers.
Returning to my earlier comment, the need to diversify capital assets—
which was a key driver during the period 1970–2000—is an even more sig-
niﬁcant factor in institutional investors’ investing decisions today. As the
globe becomes more and more integrated, asset prices become increasingly
correlated, and investors, therefore, face a growing challenge in securing
uncorrelated assets.
Pension funds, which, by their nature, are cautious in their investment
decisions, will be slow to adopt the notion of the global asset allocation
process that faces no national or asset class boundaries. It will eventually
arrive, however, and the eﬀects will be enormous given the size of pension
funds. As this unfolds, we should not underestimate the role that ﬁnancial
consultants will play in inﬂuencing the nature and direction of capital
ﬂows.
A huge uncertainty in determining the nature, pace, and direction of the
global asset allocation process as it goes forward will be estimating the
“discount rate” of future developments in the real economy for the pur-
pose of investing large funds.
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